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Like the mathematics-only reality model, the computing-element reality model also offers the same possible explanation for the evolution of organic life: common particles jostled about by random events. However, as shown in the previous sections, this is not a viable explanation, and is not considered further.
Another possible explanation is that the computing-element program explicitly programs the details of organic life. For example, the computing-element program could include the details of the DNA, proteins, and other molecules, in the first bacterium. However, this possible explanation, which is not considered further, is weak for many reasons, not the least of which is that it greatly increases the complexity of the computing-element program.
Another explanation—and much more promising—is that the evolution of organic life is the result of the cooperative action of intelligent particles—beginning in the remote past at least 3½ billion years ago, and continuing into the present. Note that with the availability of intelligent particles, there are two basic approaches in which intelligent particles can be involved with the evolution of organic life:
An inside-out process: Design innovations in an organism originate from the intelligent particles that occupy a specific instance of that organism. Once made, an innovation can be copied from the originating population of bions to other bion populations that occupy and develop new instances of that organism. In effect, this is Lamarckian evolution.
An outside-in process: There is nothing in the computing-element reality model that implies a need for common particles in the composition of a sentient being. Instead, only intelligent particles are needed. And as indicated in earlier chapters, even we humans, who have p-common bodies, exist quite well without them. Thus, given these considerations, it seems very likely that a large fraction of the sentient beings in the universe do not have a p-common body, and never have one at any time in their life-cycle (unlike for example humans who alternate having a p-common body with not having one).
It is likely that civilizations of such beings exist widely thruout the universe. And it is likely that at least some of these civilizations are highly advanced in their ability to interact with p-common particles, and in their scientific knowledge of p-common particles.
For the members of such a civilization, their interaction with p-common particles would first include direct manipulation of p-common particles by means of learned programs (until the advent of such learned programs, the beings would be unable, in effect, to “touch” any physical matter). Then, once the beings can directly manipulate physical matter, they can then proceed—more or less in the same way that humanity has proceeded—to master the science of p-common particles; and then, as their interests and needs dictate, they can use that knowledge to construct highly sophisticated p-common environments and/or machines.
Thus, given the computing-element reality model, it is possible that such a civilization, wise in the ways of p-common particles, existed in our solar system more than 3½ billion years ago—before the beginning of organic life on Earth. And it is possible that this same civilization, or a more evolved version of it, still occupies our solar system today. Presumably, the members of this civilization would each be composed of intelligent particles, in the same basic pattern as man: a single intelligent awareness particle ruling a large, cooperating population of intelligent unaware particles (i.e., a soliton ruling bions).,
The way in which this civilization could be involved with the evolution of organic life on Earth is fourfold:
They may have played a role in terraforming the Earth.
They could be the source for the original versions of many of the learned programs in our own minds.
Assuming that they have deciphered the DNA language, they could act as intelligent breeders within the limits of what the DNA language allows: for example, they could modify an organism’s DNA, and insert that modified DNA into an egg.
They could act directly for or against specific species, either in an effort to eradicate them, or in an effort to preserve them.
This range of possible activity with regard to Earth’s organic life suggests for this civilization the name of Caretakers.
Organic life depends on learned programs that, in effect, carry the knowledge and ability to construct and operate the organic structures that compose a given organism. These organic structures range in scale from organic molecules, such as DNA and protein, up to complete organs, such as the heart and lungs, and finally up to the entire organism.
Regarding learned programs in general, learned programs cannot be directly programmed into intelligent particles by any mechanism other than the computing-element program and its learning algorithms (section 3.6). The reason for this limitation is that the computing elements are inaccessible: All particles, whether intelligent or common, are data stored in computing elements (chapter 1). Thus, particles—as an effect of the computing elements—cannot be used to directly probe and/or manipulate the computing elements. Thus, for example, no civilization in this universe can ever know the actual instruction set of the computing elements, nor can it ever know the actual programming language of learned programs. Thus, no civilization in this universe can ever write, as one writes on paper, a new set of learned programs, and then program those learned programs into one or more computing elements. Thus, for example, it is not possible that in the remote past, that the Caretaker civilization designed and then caused to come into existence the first self-reproducing bacterium, because they could neither write nor program the learned programs needed by whichever bion would operate that first bacterium. Thus, only Lamarckian evolution can be the cause of an organic feature that requires a new or modified learned program to go along with that organic feature.
However, where the Caretakers can play a role is in being a source of learned programs for non-organic capabilities—such as mental capabilities. Thus, many of the learned programs in the human mind may ultimately trace back to the Caretakers. Also, the Caretakers can play a role in the large-scale needs of organic life on a planetary scale. For example, it is possible that the Caretakers have played a role in terraforming the early Earth, such as by hauling water to this planet from comets further out in the solar system.
The next chapter considers in more detail what seem to be the current activities of the Caretakers with regard to this planet, and in particular with regard to human life.
 If the innovation is a change to one or more learned programs, then the copying that is done is the copying of those learned programs from one population of bions to another.
If the innovation is a change that can be recorded into that organism’s DNA—such as recording, for example, a new design for a specific protein—then, in accordance with the rules for DNA encoding of information, that change can be made by that organism’s bions to that organism’s germ-cell DNA, and allowed to propagate thru the normal reproduction means for that organism. Presumably the rules for DNA encoding of information exist in one or more learned programs that all cell-occupying bions share, so that they all speak the same DNA language.
 Lamarckism—named after the French naturalist Jean Lamarck who proposed his theory in the early 19th century—is a theory of how organic evolution has happened. His theory states that an organism can adapt to its environment by making structural changes to itself, which can then be inherited.
Historically, Lamarckism was replaced by Darwinism due to Darwinism’s better fit with the mathematics-only reality model. Also, Lamarckism had the drawback that there is no apparent physical mechanism by which Lamarckism could happen. However, this objection is removed by the computing-element reality model, because intelligent particles provide the means by which Lamarckian changes can take place.
 Even though the beings, by means of their learned programs for manipulating p-common particles, would presumably have telekinetic and materialization powers (section 4.1), these powers would necessarily be limited in their scale, because the underlying learned-program statements can only process, and thereby affect, a limited number of p-common particles per unit time. In practice, this limitation is quite severe (for example, see the discussion of Sai Baba in section 9.4, who at his apparent best could only materialize a few kilograms of p-common particles per second). Thus, for example, if the beings want a terraformed planet, they cannot simply make such a planet by direct use of their learned programs.
Also, consider the limitations of a learned program to materialize p-common objects: Could a learned program, for example, materialize a 386 microprocessor, or some functional equivalent, if there is no nearby preexisting instance of such a microprocessor that the learned program could, in effect, scan, and therefrom make a more or less exact copy? The answer is no, because there are no learned-program statements that say, in effect, give me a 386 microprocessor, or some functional equivalent—for the same reasons that the computing-element program does not contain the designs of organic life. Thus, if the beings want, for example, a p-common computer, they cannot simply materialize one if they have none to begin with. Instead, they must first master the science of p-common particles, and then design and build that first instance. Only after doing so—and only if the object is sufficiently small—can the beings then use their learned programs to materialize copies.
 This basic pattern—a single intelligent awareness particle ruling a large, cooperating population of intelligent unaware particles—is probably also found in the larger and more intelligent animals—such as dogs, cats, elephants, whales, dolphins, horses, apes, chimpanzees, owls, and parrots. But exactly where the dividing-line falls—in other words, of those animal species that clearly have a complex mind, which of those species, if any, lack a soliton—is not an easy question. For example, do cattle have solitons? The mere fact that cattle are routinely butchered for food in many countries during the 20th century, does not necessarily mean that these animals lack a soliton, and consequently are unaware.
 The members of this civilization would differ from man primarily in terms of their learned programs. For example, because they do not have organic bodies, and apparently have no p-common body of any kind, their bions would not have any learned programs dealing with cell matters, such as organic chemistry and the DNA language.
 For example, the arising by means of Lamarckian evolution of a parasitic or poisonous species that is judged too damaging, could be singled out for eradication—assuming that eradication is possible.
 For example, during extinction events caused by comets and asteroids, such as the Cretaceous extinction event of roughly 65 million years ago, some species could be singled out for preservation. Representative members of a species could be collected and kept in a protected environment for as long as needed, until they can be safely reintroduced into the Earth’s biosphere.
In theory, an extinction event could also be arranged, so as to allow a general “housecleaning” of the Earth’s biosphere, followed by the selective reintroduction of those species wanted on the newly “cleaned” Earth.
 The Caretakers, in theory, could have designed the molecular composition of the first bacterium—its DNA, proteins, etc. But without a bion to animate it, the Caretakers would have had only a lifeless lump of organic matter—a lump that would, among other things, have been unable to reproduce itself.
 The transport of water to the Earth may be an ongoing process. Geophysicists Louis Frank and John Sigwarth have published a number of papers during the 1980s and 1990s regarding what they call small comets. Their claim, based on Earth-observing satellite data, is that:
Every few seconds a ‘snowball’ the size of a small house breaks up as it approaches Earth and deposits a large cloud of water vapor in Earth’s upper atmosphere. [quoted from their website at http://smallcomets.physics.uiowa.edu]
If this alleged influx of snowballs is correct, then it may be that this influx is the result of a deliberate transport program operated by the Caretakers.
Frank and Sigwarth have calculated that the infall rate of these small comets can account for the Earth’s oceans. Regarding the origin of the Earth’s oceans, geologist David Deming comments:
No existing theory of ocean origin by outgassing or rapid accretion on a very young Earth survives falsification. The unifying theory that explains both the origin of the ocean and the continents is the slow and gradual accumulation of water on the surface of the Earth by extraterrestrial accretion. [Eos. Trans. AGU, 82(47), Fall Meet. Suppl., Abstract U52A–0006, 2001]